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On April 22, the Supreme Court decided two consoli-dated cases construing the Federal Tort Claims Act, U.S. v Kwai Fun Wong and U.S. v June, Conservator.1 
The Court majority, 5-4, per Justice Kagan, ruled in favor of 
the claimants and against the Government in both cases.
On the face of the majority opinion, Wong and June 
come off as straightforward matters of statutory construction. 
But there’s more going on under the surface.  The cases gave 
the Court a chance to wrestle with fundamental questions of 
statutory interpretation.  And the 5-4 split reflected a familiar 
but always intriguing jurisprudential divide.
Let’s start with some basics.  Like any government, in-
cluding the monarchy before the Revolution, the United States 
enjoys sovereign immunity.  It can be sued only when it says 
it can, which it does by statute.  Early in our history, claims 
went to Congress directly.  In 1855, Congress created the U.S. 
Claims Court.  The 1887 Tucker Act, named for Virginian 
legislator John Randolph Tucker, sent contract claims to that 
court.  Slightly expanded, the Tucker Act is still around today.
It wasn’t until the Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946 
(FTCA) that Congress waived federal sovereign immunity 
for tort claims.  FTCA bills had been around for years, but it 
was after a B-25 bomber in heavy fog crashed into the Empire 
State Building that Congress was motivated to grant tort relief 
to victims.
Fast forward a half century to the facts of our consolidated 
cases.  In 1999, Kwai Fun Wong was detained by the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service in Oregon on suspicion of 
illegal entry into the country.  Wong is a Hong Kong native 
and British citizen, and a minister of an East Asian universalist 
faith.  She alleged in a lawsuit that INS officials violated her 
rights by strip searching her and denying her vegetarian meals 
before she was deported.  About the same time she filed her 
lawsuit, in May of 2001, she filed an FTCA negligence claim 
with the INS.
Under the FTCA, a person has two years in which to file 
a claim for relief and has to file first with the allegedly offending 
administrative agency.  Wong did that.  
A claimant then has six months from the agency’s denial 
or failure to act to file a claim in federal district court.  There 
things became knotty.  The INS denied her claim in December 
of 2001.  She already had a civil rights case going in court.  So 
four months after the denial, she asked the federal district court 
for leave to amend her complaint, to add the FTCA claim.  The 
district court granted leave, but by then, six months had come 
and gone.  Wong filed, but the Government later asserted the 
essence of its position in these cases:  that the limitations periods 
of the FTCA are jurisdictional and are not subject to equitable 
tolling.  Nevertheless, the district court sided with Wong.
Wong’s companion case, June, dealt with the initial two-
year limitations period of the FTCA.  In 2005, Andrew Booth 
was killed in a fatal car crash in Arizona.  June was conserva-
tor for Booth’s minor son in a wrongful death action against 
the state and its contractor, alleging negligent installation of 
highway barriers.  According to June, it was four years after 
the accident, in the course of litigating the state lawsuit, that 
she discovered the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) 
had concealed its negligence in approving the barriers without 
proper crash-testing.  So June filed her claim with the FHWA 
in 2010, by then five years after the accident.  In June’s case, 
the district court agreed with the Government that the FTCA 
period had run.
The Ninth Circuit en banc held that the FTCA limita-
tions are not jurisdictional, and are subject to equitable tolling, 
affirming Wong, reversing June, and giving both claimants the 
green light.  So the Government went to the Supreme Court. 
Solicitors argued that Congress intended the FTCA limita-
tions to be jurisdictional and not subject to equitable tolling. 
After all, the Government reasoned, the FTCA is a waiver 
of sovereign immunity.  It’s strictly construed to minimize 
Government exposure, so any ambiguity should be resolved 
in the Government’s favor.  Moreover, the 1946 statute copied 
the earlier Tucker Act, declaring claims after limitations to be 
“forever barred.”  
But throwing a wrench into the Government’s argument 
was a 1990 case called Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs2 
under the 1964 Civil Rights Act.  The Irwin Court opined that 
law-by-law adjudication of the congressional intent behind limi-
tations was generating inconsistency and uncertainty.  Instead, 
the Court would have a new rule, a rebuttable presumption: 
limitations periods in federal law are not jurisdictional—so 
can be tolled—unless Congress makes a clear statement to the 
contrary.  Accordingly, Wong’s and June’s lawyers argued that 
there is no clear statement in the FTCA, so its limitations are 
subject to tolling.
Kagan led the majority, joined by Kennedy, Ginsburg, 
Breyer, and Sotomayor.  The Court, 5-4, affirmed the Ninth 
Circuit, siding with Wong and June.  Irwin controlled.  FTCA 
limitations are non-jurisdictional for want of a clear statement, 
so claimants are entitled to equitable tolling.
The Irwin rule of rebuttable presumption is a “realistic 
assessment of legislative intent,” Kagan wrote, better than the 
old rule of ad hoc fidelity to Congress.  Usually a limitations 
period is just a claims processing rule, so Congress has to “do 
something special . . . to tag a statute of limitations as jurisdic-
tional.”  The FTCA uses “ordinary, run-of-the-mill” language, 
so doesn’t do anything special.  There is no clear statement in 
legislative history, and Congress never added a clear statement 
by amendment.
Kagan explained as mere “legal rhetoric” the coincidence 
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of language in the Tucker Act and the FTCA. And anyway, she 
wrote, when the Court reaffirmed Tucker limitations as jurisdic-
tional, it did so because of stare decisis, not because of the Irwin 
rule.  Quoting Justice Brandeis: “[I]t [wa]s more important that 
the rule ‘be settled than that it be settled right.’”3 
Kagan also rejected the Government’s argument of strict 
construction of sovereign immunity waiver.  That the FTCA was 
enacted in a different era, when Congress might have had differ-
ent expectations, is still not a clear statement.  The FTCA’s own 
history and language can be read to support equitable tolling. 
Limitations and jurisdiction are in different sections.  The also 
FTCA expressly likens the United States to “a private person” 
for purpose of tort liability.  Kagan wrote, “[T]he FTCA treats 
the United States more like a commoner than like the Crown.”
Justice Alito dissented, joined by Roberts, Scalia, and 
Thomas.  According to Alito, the text of the statute, its his-
tory, and more than a century of precedent all pointed in the 
opposite direction.  
On the text of the statute, Congress plainly intended a 
strictly limited waiver of immunity, fearful of open-ended tort 
liability.  Causes such as defamation, and remedies such as puni-
tive damages, are disallowed.  Nine of thirty-one FTCA bills in 
Congress expressly authorized equitable tolling, and Congress 
passed a bill that did not.  The FTCA used Tucker language, 
which has been construed invariably as jurisdictional.  And 
lower courts caught on to the likeness, construing the FTCA 
likewise.  Irwin doesn’t even come into play, Alito reasoned, 
when the court lacks jurisdiction to begin with.
Alternatively, Alito argued, Congress still intended no 
equitable tolling.  That’s clear in the “forever barred” command-
ment.  What Kagan found “run-of-the-mill,” Alito found “no 
weak kneed command.”  Pointing to grammar, Alito opined 
that limitations usually direct themselves to claimants, such 
as “A person shall [or may] file.”  “Forever barred” is a passive 
structure, focusing on the defendant Government. 
The conventional takeaway from Wong and June is that it’s 
now easier to sue the Government.  If you have a case that’s late 
under the two-year or six-month limitations, and you would 
be entitled to equitable tolling in a private civil action, you can 
now get equitable tolling against the Government.  Congress 
can always change that rule if it wants to.
But under the surface of Wong and June, there’s more 
going on.  The oral argument in the case sometimes delved 
into a surreal level of abstraction, revealing powerful currents 
in jurisprudence.  
The deeper question surfaced in Justice Kagan’s point 
about fidelity to Congress.  Both sides on the Court agree in 
principle that legislative intent controls.  But the Court cre-
ated a problem for itself in Irwin when it changed the rule to a 
convenient facsimile of intent.  The majority does not reject the 
argument that Congress legislated in 1946 against a backdrop 
of strict construction and jurisdictional limitations.  But the 
Court decided that in the absence of a clear line of precedent, 
Irwin controls regardless of whether the statute in question 
came before or after Irwin in 1990.  
The Court’s position runs headlong into a declaration 
by Justice Alito: that the “meaning [of the FTCA], of course, 
cannot change over time.”
It’s worth noting that the Court’s opinion in Irwin was 
authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist and joined by both 
Kennedy and Scalia.  But Scalia here sides with Alito.  Scalia 
quipped in oral argument that the claimants seemed to want 
“a living [FTCA].”  
So this case about statutory interpretation reverberates 
with broader ideas about the role of the courts.  Wong and 
June ask, what happens when the Court changes the rules of 
the interpretive game?  Can a legal context later in time be 
dropped in behind an earlier Congress, even when everyone 
knows that’s a fiction?  
Scalia bought into rebuttable presumption twenty-five 
years ago in Irwin.  But he refused to apply Irwin when it 
seemed to defy legislative intent.
So on the surface, Wong and June are straightforward, 
applying the Irwin rule to construe FTCA limitations in favor 
of claimants.  But at a deeper level, the divide in Wong and June 
concerns the role of the courts vis-à-vis Congress—one side on 
the Court more willing to wield judicial prerogative and chal-
lenge Congress to keep pace; the other side on the Court more 
determined to cast itself as mere umpire, calling balls and strikes.
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